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Introduction  
Payday lending is a form of short term credit that charges a per dollar fee for borrowing 
and is most commonly used by credit constrained individuals (Huckstep 2007). The first payday 
loan location opened in 1993 (Gallmeyer and Roberts, 2009).  It has grown in popularity since its 
introduction in the 1990s and is currently one of the fastest growing consumer finance products 
(Caskey, 2001). There are more payday lending locations in the United States than McDonalds 
and Starbucks combined which is over lending 50,000 locations (Zinman, 2010). To take out a 
payday loan a borrower demonstrates proof of employment such as a paystub and proof that they 
have a checking account (Caskey, 2001).  Payday lenders rarely run a formal credit check 
(Morse, 2011). The borrower writes a post-dated check for the loan amount plus fees (Huckstep, 
2007). This post-dated check serves as collateral. The loan is typically due on the borrower’s 
next payday (Huckstep, 2007). The goal of this study is to determine if there is a relationship 
between the legality of payday lending and the poverty outcomes in a state.  
Relevant Literature 
The existing literature on payday loans focuses on predation, consumer welfare, 
substitutes and pricing, and regulation.  
Financial predation is targeting those who are susceptible to payday loans and that lack 
an education or viable alternatives. Gallmeyer and Roberts, (2009) use spatial analysis to 
determine where payday lenders tend to cluster. Their research finds that moderately 
impoverished communities have the highest concentrations of payday lenders. Lenders are more 
likely to be in lower-income and moderate poverty neighborhoods with higher percentages of 
minorities, immigrants, young adults, elderly, military personnel and members of non-
management or nonprofessional careers. Gallmeyer and Roberts argue that payday lender 
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locations are indicative of community economic distress. Disney and Gathergood (2014) gage 
financial literacy as a variable of payday lending. They find that people with lower financial 
literacy are more likely to have a portfolio of debt with a higher APR (2014). Another finding of 
this study is that typically, these borrowers are unaware that they are financially illiterate. 
Consistent with Gallmeyer and Roberts (2009) they find that households with lower income, 
lower percentages of home ownership, lower levels of education, lower levels of employment 
and higher percentages of unemployment are more likely to perform poorly on a financial 
literacy test. Canann and Evans (2014) find that lenders are in areas with lower median ages, 
larger numbers of unmarried households, and higher quantities of fast food restaurants (2014). 
These location studies are very consistent in their conclusion that younger people and lower 
income recipients are more likely to live near a payday lender. These consumers are particularly 
susceptible to the payday lending solution. 
A related line of research focuses on whether payday loans cause further harm to the 
borrower. Results regarding the trade-offs between costs and benefits of these loans are mixed. 
Some previous studies find that the net effect of payday borrowing includes declines in job 
performance, elevated bankruptcy, difficulty paying bills, and other adverse conditions while 
others find an increase in job retention, smoothing financial shocks and that restricting access 
leads to use of higher cost alternatives (Bhutta, 2014; Skiba and Tobacman, 2011; Carrell and 
Zinman, 2013; Melzer 2011). Zinman (2010) proposes that economic principles would lead one 
to believe that the growth of the industry was indicative of a service that adds value.  The author 
points out the expanding consumer access to credit is also considered to be a financial 
development strategy. Morse (2011) uses natural disasters as an indicator of financial distress 
and then compares whether access to payday lending negatively affects outcomes. The author 
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finds that access to payday lenders result in a favorable outcome to borrowers facing financial 
distress.  He also finds that payday lender access decreases small property crime after a natural 
disaster. Bhutta (2014) also studies the effect of payday loans on consumer financial health and 
finds little proof that payday loans substantially affect credit scores or cause other debt 
management crises. Desai and Ellihausen (2017) study the effects of payday lending bans on 
consumer credit delinquencies and find that access to payday lenders cannot induce significant 
financial distress in the forms of bankruptcy, unemployment or foreclosures. On the contrary, 
they find that in Georgia, where an outright ban has existed, delinquencies increased in the 
period after the ban. In a study on Oregon’s regulation of payday lending, Zinman (2014) finds 
that respondents were more likely to suffer financially following the elimination of lenders 
(2010), and finds that lack of access to payday lenders prevented productive investment and 
consumption smoothing.  
 In a study focused on members of the United States Air Force, Carrell and Zinman 
(2014), find that payday loans can be detrimental to the airmen’s financial health and job 
performance in the Air Force. Access to payday loans may be responsible for lower job 
performance and readiness, may increase the likelihood that an airman is ineligible to reenlist, 
and correlates with a decline in actual reenlistment. These results are more disturbing since it 
appears that military members are three times more likely to take out a payday loan than civilians 
(Gallmeyer and Roberts 2009).  These findings are consistent with the Department of Defense 
beliefs that “Predatory lending undermines military readiness, harms the morale of troops and 
their families, and adds to the cost of fielding an all-volunteer fighting force.”1  According to 
                                                          
1 United States Government., Department of Defense. (2006). Report on Predatory Lending  
Practices Directed at Members of the Armed Forces and Their Dependents. Washington DC: Department of 
Defense. 
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Carrell and Zinman (2014), younger airmen seem to be the most vulnerable to the effects of 
these loans especially those in nonfinance occupations. This is consistent with other studies that 
find younger people, in general to be more vulnerable to payday lending (Canaan and Evans, 
2014; Gallmeyer and Roberts, 2009).  
The debt trap is commonly brought up in the discussion of payday lending effects on 
consumer welfare and used as a justification for regulating the industry. The term “debt trap” 
refers to a cycle of rollovers and renewals that prevent borrowers from being able to pay off their 
loan and leave them in more debt as a result than as a consequence of spending. It also means the 
burden of fees would negatively affect the bowers ability to make payments on other forms of 
debt (Desai and Elliehausen, 2017).  Most consumers are unable to pay the loan off in the first 
period (Huckstep, 2007).  A borrower pays a rollover fee in cash to push back the due date of the 
loan or rollover the balance. A borrower could also go to a different payday loan location and 
borrow to pay off the loan. This creates a debt cycle. To prevent the debt trap legislatures place 
limits on renewals, intervals between loans, caps on loans per year, installment payment plans 
requirements and rate caps (Desai and Elliehausen, 2017). 
Alternatives to payday loans do exist in several forms most commonly bank overdraft. 
Many payday borrowers cite not bouncing checks as a benefit of payday lending (Melzer and 
Morgan, 2015). Melzer and Morgan (2015) study the competition between payday lenders and 
overdraft credit from banks. The authors point out that in 2007 depository institutions earned an 
estimated $23 billion from overdraft fees, while 8 to 9 billion were paid in interest on $50 billion 
of payday loans.  The authors argue that since qualifications to use these types of credit are 
similar, they should be treated as substitutes. Banks extend overdraft credit based on algorithms.  
It is a flat fee with little to no price discrimination and it makes up 43% of non-interest income. 
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Melzer and Morgan (2015) conclude that banks and payday lender compete not in pricing but in 
risk profile and size of loans. Some counter-intuitive findings regarding the relationship between 
these two forms of personal short-term lending include, the banks’ increase of their overdraft 
protection in response to the presence of payday lenders, and a lower the cost of overdraft credit 
in states with lending prohibitions (Melzer and Morgan, 2015). 
There are other alternatives to payday lending available but these alternatives are not 
considered direct substitutes. The absence of payday lenders causes delinquencies in bills 
payments and as a result late fees (Zinman, 2010).  As an alternative to a payday loan a borrower 
could pawn a personal possession for a loan assuming they have an item of value (Huckstep, 
2007). Title pawns are also an option but present a real threat of property loss (Huckstep, 2007). 
Consumers could also charge expenses to credit cards but access to credit cards requires a 
relatively clean credit history (Huckstep, 2007), which is not characteristic of the typical payday 
borrower. In summary, these alternatives can be high cost or unavailable to the typical payday 
borrower. While borrowing from family members seems like a viable alternative, most 
individuals refuse to do so due to the stress and potential for humiliation (Huckstep, 2007). 
Payday loans, on the other hand, appear to provide a satisfactory credit option to otherwise 
constrained borrowers.  
The annualized rates for payday loans feature APRs as high as 400 % (Gallmeyer and 
Roberts, 2009). These high costs are often cited by legislators and opponents to the industry. 
Huckstep (2007) investigates if these high prices lead to equally high profits. The author 
concludes that, in comparison to other lending agencies payday lender profits are lower, about 
half of mainstream lenders. He observes that the industry justifies high rates by the value of the 
service provided, high operating of offering and administering payday loans and high default 
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rates on these loans.  A study by Canann and Evans (2014) finds that rates are set based on local 
risk factors proxied by local default rates and competition. Consumers do not make their 
decisions based on rates or price but on convenience (Huckstep, 2007).  
Consumer decision making is also affected by cognitive bias and the way in which the 
relevant information is disclosed (Morse and Bertrand, 2011). Cognitive bias influences the way 
people think and make decisions. In the case of payday lending, it is any thought pattern that 
would result in making an irrational borrowing decision. In a randomized field study Morse and 
Bertrand (2011) study the methods of disclosure before payday loans are disbursed to identify 
possibilities for such cognitive bias. They use three styles of disclosures: an APR comparison 
with other forms of credit, the dollar amount of fees associated with the loan as the loan is 
renewed, and refinancing information which provides the repayment data for the typical payday 
loan borrower. Borrowers were also provided with a savings plan. It is common for lending 
regulations to mandate that the APR be listed on financial forms. However, their disclosure 
expands on that with comparison data on other consumer credit rates. This study finds that 
cognitive bias and other limitations have a significant effect on loan decisions. All three 
disclosure styles reduce loan usage and dollar amount borrowed. 
The regulation of payday lending seeks to remedy any negative outcomes associated with 
these loans. Regulation varies from state to state with one major exclusion, the Military Lending 
Act (Zinman 2014). The Military Lending Act protects servicemen and their families from APRs 
above 36%. Zinman observes that currently at least 13 states have some degree restrictions on 
payday lending. North Carolina and Georgia have come the closest to eliminating payday 
lending (Gallmeyer and Roberts, 2009). Researchers expect that number to grow as public 
dissatisfaction with the rates also increase (Zinman, 2010), (Huckstep, 2007). In the study of the 
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Oregon rate cap, which effectively shut down payday lending, Zinman finds that while the use of 
short-term credit decreased consumers shifted to alternatives. A study by Desai and Elliehausen 
(2017), designed to build on Zinman’s 2010 study finds that legislation had little effect on credit 
delinquencies. That study also finds that in Georgia there were increased revolving credit 
delinquencies following the ban.  
Existing literature on payday lending could be expanded upon by investigating legislation 
in states of varying degrees of regulation and the effect it has on financial wellbeing of the state. 
The goal of this research would be to determine what effect if any these laws have on state’s 
average financial health of their citizens. Our Research design relies on state-level aggregate 
economic data and legal environments of various states for comparison. 
Proof of High Annual Percentage Rate  
 Using averages provided by the Pew Charitable Trusts I will calculate the APR for 
several different venues of payday loans. The periodic rate of a payday loan is calculated by 
dividing the fee by the principle. To arrive at the annual rate, the periodic is then multiplied by 
365 and divided by the term of the loan, 14 days. The average loan is $375 for a term of two 
weeks. If that loan is originated in a payday lending store the average fee is $55. This constitutes 
a 382.38% APR. If the borrower receives their loan online, she will pay a fee of $95 and that 
makes the APR 660.48 %. If the borrower goes to his or her bank for the loan the fee is $35. That 
is an APR of 243.33%.  
Table 1. A sample of annualized rates charged on payday loans at different venue types. 











Store Location 375 55 365 14 382.381 
Online 375 95 365 14 660.4762 
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Bank 375 35 365 14 243.3333 
 
Recent Legislation  
 On October 5, 2017 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau finalized their rule to 
prevent debt traps caused by payday lending. Payday lenders are now required to determine 
upfront if the borrower has the means to repay the loan (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
2017). Borrowers must now pass a full payment test for all payday and auto-title loans that 
exceed $500 (CFPB, 2017). A lender can now only offer a new loan if one third of the previous 
loan has been repaid (CFPB, 2017). The risks of the loans must be explained in plain language to 
the borrower preempting the loan application and decision (CFPB, 2017).  Further protection is 
provided to the borrower by granting them the right to dispute any unauthorized or erroneous 
attempts to remove money from their account (CFPB, 2017). The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau requires that a lender provide written notice that the collection of debt is imminent and 
that lenders stop after 2 bounces (2017).  
Methods 
 This study aims to determine if limiting access to credit by restricting payday lenders will 
negatively affects consumers. I hypothesize based on previous literature that payday loans offer a 
valuable service to credit constrained borrowers, and therefore states with restrictions will have 
more negative financial outcomes for consumers, specifically in the United States. The 
alternative hypothesis states that because payday lending is predatory, stronger anti-payday 
legislation will have better financial outcomes. Financial distress is proxied by wages, 
unemployment rates, home ownership rates, and mortgage delinquency rates. I collect this data 
from the US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Census, and Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau respectively.  
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I begin by identifying the legal status of payday lending in the 50 states. There are many 
methods used by states designed to limit the pervasiveness of payday lending. Though this study 
only considers whether the payday loans are allowed in any form or are completely prohibited, I 
include the summary of various degrees of restrictions imposed by different states.  
I use non-parametric measures to analyze the legality of payday lending and their effect 
on financial outcomes. Nonparametric measures make fewer assumptions about the population 
and therefore are useful in quantifying the results of an environment. Nonparametric tests are 
also a desirable tool for the smaller sample size used in this study. The financial outcomes, my 
dependent variables, considered will be state average weekly wages, unemployment rates, 
homeownership rates, mortgage delinquency rates for 30 and 90 days. These are commonly used 
measured of overall consumer financial health. This study will use weekly wage, 30 and 90-day 
mortgage delinquency rates and unemployment rates as measures of financial distress. 0 
indicates that payday lending is legal in a state and 1 indicates that payday lending is illegal. 
In addition, I use a logistic regression analysis in this study to confirm or reject the 
relationship between the legality of payday loans and the effect on financial outcomes. In the 
logistic regression the dependent variables are 0 or 1 and the independent variable is continuous. 
I use this regression coupled with the non-parametric measures to measure the effects on payday 
lending legality.  
Data Analysis 
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I start with the analysis of the relationship between payday loan legality and average 
weekly wages. Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction to analyze the 
relationship I find that the mean weekly wage in states where payday lending is illegal is 
$1006.13 as compared to $928.21 in the states where they are legal. This test also produces a p 
value of less than .0001 indicating a high level of statistical significance for using legality of 
payday lending as a predictor of wage.  As pictured in Figure 1, the results of this test indicate 
higher wages in states where payday lending is illegal.  
Figure 1 
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While I establish the difference between the average weekly pay in the states where payday loans 
are allowed and those where payday loans are prohibited, the causality of this result is unclear.  
On one hand it is possible that states with higher average weekly wages do not have the need for 
payday loans. On the other hand, this could indicate that legality is a predictor of average weekly 
wage. To test for this relationship, I reverse the function so that wage is the independent variable 
and that legality is the dependent variable. Using a logistic regression, I find that there may be a 
relationship between higher average annual wage and the state making the practice illegal. The 
regression is shown in Figure 2 and has a p value of .08.  
 Next, I examine the relationship between the legal status of the payday loans and Home 
Ownership Rate per State over 4 years from 2014 to 2017. Home ownership rates are the number 
of houses owned in a state divided by the total number of houses. This excludes properties that 
are rented.  When using a Welch Two Sample t-test there is no indication of statistical 
significance of a relationship between homeownership and legality of payday lending with a p 
Figure 2 
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value of 0.8435. Using the same sample, a Wilcoxon rank sum test again finds no statistical 
significance with a p value of 0.744. As seen in Figure 3 the ranges for both legal and illegal are 
similar. Payday lending being illegal is not an accurate predictor of homeownership rates. 
 My next analysis is  designed to examine the effect of unemployment on whether or not payday 
lending is legal in that state or not. The mean unemployment rate for states with payday lending is 4.25% 
and 4.23% for those without using a Welch two sample t-test. The p value is 0.928 which does not 
indicate statistical significance of this relationship. There is little to effect on unemployment rates as a 
direct result of payday lending availability.  
 Finally I focus on morgtage deliquency rates as a proxy of financial distress and their association 
with the legal status payday lending. I consider two stages of deliquency: past due for 90 days and past 
due for 30 days. Comparison of 90-day delinquency rates between the states allowing and prohibiting 
payday lending reveals lower delinquency rates for the states that allow this type of credit. According to 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureou, average 90-day mortgage delinquency rates are 1.52% in 
states with payday lending as compared to 1.79% in states where it is illegal.   Using a Welch two sample 
t-test, I find that this difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0353. A Wilcoxon rank sum 
Figure 3 
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test on the same date confirms the statistical significance of the differnce in  the mean 90-day 
delequencies (p-value of 0.0407) Figure 4 illustrates that the mean delequencies for states where payday 
lending is legal is lower than the mean deliqunecies where payday loans are prohibited.  The results of a 
wilcoson rank and sum test are similar for the differences in 30 day mortgage deliquency rates (p-value of 
0.0372) The Welch two sample t-test yields a p value of 0.1239. These findings indicate that in states 
where payday lending is illegal there are larger percentages of homeowners who are 30 or 90 days past 
due on their mortgage. When the dependency of variables is flipped as shown in Figure 5 the percentage 
of homeowners 90 days deliquent on their mortgage is a statistically significant predictor of whether 
payday lending is legal in that state. This lostic regression has a p value of 0.028.  
Figure 4 
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 This study finds that states without payday lending have higher average weekly wages. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between payday lending legality and 
homeownership or unemployment. There is statistical evidence that in states with payday lending 
access mortgage delinquency rates, both 30 and 90 days past due are lower. This could indicate 
that providing credit access through payday loans helps mitigate financial shocks. This would be 
in line with the findings by Morse in his 2011 study.  
 The data used in this study has limitations because it uses state wide metrics rather than 
individual consumer data on use of payday lending or financial wellbeing or distress. Larger data 
sets and higher analytics were outside of the scope of this study.  
Future studies can use multiple variables to rank the legality and limitations placed on  
Figure 5 
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payday lending by state regulators. Using those rankings these studies could compare the legal 
environment to financial factors like those utilized in this study. Future research could also 
examine the impact of the Consumers Financial Protection Bureau’s most recent regulation of 
the industry.   
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Appendix 2- State Data 
 
State 
  Average Weekly 
Wage Rate 2016 Rate 2017 2014 AVG2015 AVG2016 AVG2017 AVG2014 AVG2015 AVG2016 AVG2017 AVG2017 AVG2016 AVG2015 AVG2014 AVG
Alabama  $            862.00 6.3 3.5 2.25833 1.83333 1.525 1.3 3.56667 3.30833 3.225 3.36667 3.4 69.6 70.0 72.1
Alaska  $         1,031.00 6.6 7.3 1 0.79167 0.625 0.46667 1.60833 1.46667 1.49167 1.56667 1.5 65.2 62.3 64.9
Arizona  $            933.00 5 4.5 1.36667 1.15 0.95 0.8 1.99167 1.83333 1.83333 1.8 1.9 61.9 61.7 63.5
Arkansas  $            799.00 3.9 3.7 2.325 1.74167 1.35 1.33333 3.13333 2.9 2.79167 2.9 2.9 67.6 67.1 65.5
California  $         1,211.00 5.2 4.3 1.49167 1.06667 0.775 0.66667 1.675 1.50833 1.41667 1.33333 1.5 53.8 54.3 54.2
Colorado  $         1,051.00 3 3.1 1.1 0.79167 0.59167 0.5 1.48333 1.31667 1.29167 1.26667 1.3 62.4 63.6 65.0
Connecticut  $         1,267.00 4.4 4.6 2.85 2.53333 1.96667 1.63333 2.575 2.48333 2.375 2.4 2.5 64.2 66.5 67.4
Delaware  $         1,034.00 4.3 4.6 3.26667 2.68333 2.19167 1.8 2.80833 2.575 2.55833 2.5 2.6 73.0 73.3 74.3
Florida  $            905.00 4.9 3.7 4.08333 2.825 1.875 1.5 2.49167 2.3 2.16667 2.13333 2.3 64.4 64.8 64.9
Georgia  $            975.00 5.5 4.4 2.46667 1.9 1.475 1.3 3.25833 3.00833 2.84167 2.83333 3.0 62.3 62.9 63.0
Hawaii  $            927.00 2.9 2 2.14167 1.60833 1.21667 1 1.35833 1.20833 1.11667 1.1 1.2 57.7 59.3 58.5
Idaho  $            762.00 3.6 2.9 1.29167 0.975 0.73333 0.66667 1.89167 1.75833 1.85 1.83333 1.8 70.6 70.0 69.6
Illinois  $         1,086.00 5.7 4.8 2.48333 2.03333 1.53333 1.3 2.25 2.05833 1.96667 1.96667 2.1 65.3 65.4 66.4
Indiana  $            857.00 4 3.4 2.08333 1.70833 1.375 1.2 2.91667 2.60833 2.50833 2.46667 2.6 70.9 69.4 70.1
Iowa  $            864.00 3.5 2.8 1.41667 1.18333 0.93333 1 1.93333 1.7 1.69167 1.7 1.8 70.0 68.9 69.4
Kansas  $            849.00 4.3 3.4 1.575 1.29167 1.08333 0.9 2.24167 1.975 1.84167 1.86667 2.0 67.1 64.9 64.7
Kentucky  $            848.00 4.8 4.4 2.04167 1.75 1.55 1.36667 2.71667 2.475 2.41667 2.53333 2.5 68.0 67.9 67.6
Louisiana  $            877.00 6 4.6 2.45 2.075 2.01667 2 3.9 3.76667 3.69167 3.8 3.8 64.2 63.4 65.3
Maine  $            819.00 3.8 3 2.875 2.76667 1.99167 1.73333 2.60833 2.6 2.38333 2.26667 2.5 72.7 70.0 71.0
Maryland  $         1,117.00 4.2 4 3.34167 2.53333 1.94167 1.7 2.74167 2.56667 2.44167 2.43333 2.5 66.6 67.1 66.2
Massachusetts  $         1,297.00 3.1 3.5 2.44167 2.075 1.46667 1.23333 2.16667 2.00833 1.86667 1.83333 2.0 59.8 60.5 63.0
Michigan  $            980.00 5.1 4.7 1.76667 1.33333 0.975 0.83333 2.54167 2.30833 2.13333 2.16667 2.3 72.8 74.6 73.9
Minnesota  $         1,044.00 4 3.1 1.20833 0.93333 0.74167 0.7 1.65 1.48333 1.40833 1.43333 1.5 72.5 70.2 71.4
Mississippi  $            734.00 5.5 4.6 3.28333 2.83333 2.40833 2.26667 5.19167 4.9 4.71667 4.73333 4.9 69.8 70.7 73.2
Missouri  $            887.00 4.4 3.5 1.9 1.46667 1.16667 1 2.70833 2.45833 2.31667 2.33333 2.5 66.7 68.6 70.5
Montana  $            783.00 4 4.1 1.09167 0.91667 0.80833 0.9 1.68333 1.54167 1.70833 1.56667 1.6 67.1 66.4 66.9
Nebraska  $            838.00 3.3 2.7 1.10833 0.91667 0.81667 0.7 1.79167 1.58333 1.45833 1.36667 1.6 68.0 68.2 66.8
Nevada  $            906.00 5.1 5 3.53333 2.64167 1.725 1.26667 1.90833 1.69167 1.625 1.53333 1.7 54.6 54.8 55.9
New 
Hampshire
 $         1,030.00 2.7 2.6
1.45 1.30833 1 0.86667 2.45 2.06667 1.84167 1.83333 2.0 71.9 71.7 72.2
New Jersey  $         1,207.00 4.7 5 4.525 3.71667 2.84167 2.3 2.44167 2.31667 2.23333 2.23333 2.3 62.2 64.0 65.2
New Mexico  $            819.00 6.7 6 2.175 1.99167 1.71667 1.6 2.51667 2.375 2.35 2.36667 2.4 67.3 66.5 66.3
New York  $         1,307.00 4.8 4.6 3.68333 3.125 2.35 1.96667 2.58333 2.375 2.25833 2.23333 2.4 51.6 51.5 52.9
North Carolina  $            909.00 5.2 4.5
2.20833 1.85 1.49167 1.46667 3.19167 2.875 2.75 2.73333 2.9 65.8 65.2 66.4
North Dakota  $            940.00 3 2.6 0.74167 0.58333 0.55 0.66667 1.09167 1.14167 1.30833 1.3 1.2 61.5 61.8 64.6
Ohio  $            917.00 5 4.7 2.16667 1.75 1.425 1.23333 2.59167 2.43333 2.31667 2.36667 2.4 66.1 66.5 67.4
Oklahoma  $            844.00 4.8 4.1 1.95 1.60833 1.6 1.53333 2.875 2.59167 2.9 3 2.8 66.8 67.5 69.3
Oregon  $            951.00 4.5 4.1 1.95 1.45833 1.01667 0.76667 1.31667 1.19167 1.06667 1.13333 1.2 62.6 61.1 62.9
Pennsylvania  $         1,009.00 5.4 4.7 2.55833 2.19167 1.8 1.63333 3.16667 2.925 2.85 2.86667 3.0 68.5 69.6 69.7
Rhode Island  $            989.00 4.9 4.4 2.98333 2.79167 1.98333 1.7 2.79167 2.49167 2.325 2.33333 2.5 56.3 58.9 61.9
South Carolina  $            825.00 4.3 4.1 2.44167 2.08333 1.83333 1.66667 3.46667 3.26667 3.2 3.16667 3.3 68.9 67.1 73.0
South Dakota  $            792.00 2.9 3.5 0.96667 0.80833 0.71667 0.73333 1.51667 1.41667 1.54167 1.66667 1.5 69.5 70.2 69.2
Tennessee  $            912.00 5.1 3.2 2.075 1.64167 1.33333 1.16667 3.33333 3.04167 2.83333 2.8 3.0 66.5 66.6 66.8
Texas  $         1,045.00 4.8 3.9 1.90833 1.65 1.31667 1.23333 3.31667 3.1 2.95833 3.03333 3.1 61.5 61.9 62.2
Utah  $            870.00 3.2 3.1 1.34167 0.99167 0.81667 0.66667 1.825 1.775 1.7 1.6 1.7 71.3 69.9 70.9
Vermont  $            866.00 3.2 2.8 1.55833 1.34167 1.25833 1.13333 1.90833 1.96667 1.63333 1.46667 1.7 71.4 71.9 73.5
Virginia  $         1,055.00 4.1 3.7 1.61667 1.39167 1.06667 1 2.275 2.125 2.01667 1.96667 2.1 66.3 67.1 68.7
Washington  $         1,135.00 5.1 4.5 2.00833 1.40833 0.96667 0.73333 1.38333 1.2 1.075 1.03333 1.2 61.6 62.6 63.6
West Virginia  $            801.00 5.8 5.5 1.79167 1.63333 1.70833 1.6 3.775 3.38333 3.625 3.56667 3.6 74.7 75.0 75.6
Wisconsin  $            885.00 4.1 3 1.30833 1.03333 0.80833 0.73333 1.69167 1.43333 1.4 1.4 1.5 67.7 66.6 67.8
Wyoming 4.8 4.2 0.98333 0.95 0.94167 0.93333 2.2 2.175 2.30833 2.26667 2.2 70.2 70.0 70.8
Unemployment Mortgage Deliquency 90 days Mortgage Deliquency 30 days Home Ownership Rates
